Truth of
classifications in taxonomy
A. A.
Stekolnikov
The Linnaean
Miscellanea (Sbornik Trudov Zoologicheskogo Muzeya MGU 48, Moscow,
Moscow Univ. Publ.): 101-122 (2007) (In Russian, English summary).
S U M M A R Y
Classification
considered from the standpoint of
traditional logic is only one of the aspects of biological taxonomy,
that is
common with other sciences (geology, archeology, linguistics etc.). The
question of truth in respect to this aspect is studied. Correspondence
theory
of truth and the method of truth definition in empiricism are
characterized
briefly. Inadequacy of the correspondence theory is shown by an example
of
theoretical taxonomical works by Pavlinov (2004) and Zuev (2002). A
version of
idealistic conception of truth is then developed, opposed to the
correspondence
theory (and metaphysical realism), as well as to empiricism. The main
idea of
this concept is that truth of knowledge consists of dependence of
knowledge on
consciousness; only the latter gives existence to empirical evidence as
such by
imparting form to it. The conception originates from the interest in
existence,
which was characteristic of the European philosophy from the early
beginning
and can serve for determination of science as distinct from other
fields of
cognition. But in contrast to the classical idea of truth, the supposed
answer
to the question of existence in our conception is that given object is
an
artefact, but not an element of objective reality.
In
accordance with this idea, the truth of
classification consists of revealing the arbitrariness of classes.
Classification treated as creation of classes can not exist, since
properties
of classes, basis of classification, supreme genus, and classified
objects are
given; the activity of investigator may consist only in identification
of
objects (assigning to proper classes) or in reorganization of the
system of
classes. But when compiling a diagnosis, taxonomist analyzes this
identification
activity and thus critisizes the process of perceiving in which he was
involved
himself previously, during identification. This allow him recognizing
the
arbitrariness of a given classification, and then proceeding to its
reorganization. However, the truth does not lie in a new classification
but
just in this recognition that leads taxonomists to developing the field
of
subjectivity.
Diagnosis
compiler pays attention to the perceiving of
properties, but usually he does not question the origin of objects. But
biological systematics is able to critisize its objects, though only
outside
the traditional theory of classification.
Considering
a taxonomist as a subject of knowledge cannot ignore his
somatic aspect, namely, possessing senses. The common opinion that
Cartesian
basis of science presupposes considering the sentient body as external
object
only that is opposed to pure thought, is not quite correct. The initial
stage
of the Descartes' construction in his "Meditations on First Philosophy"
treates
sense as an attribute of "thinking thing". Subject of knowledge really
begins
with the doubt of sense, but he finishes with involving the sense into
the
field of pure thought.
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